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DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES IN EMPLOYMENT
REFERENCES: A POSSIBLE POISONOUS POTION
FOR THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY?
Allan J. Jacobs, MD.*
A series of cases has applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311
(hereinafter "§ 311") to find third-party liability for physical harm
proximately caused by negligent misrepresentation in employment
references. This has a potentially significant effect on health care
institutions and physician administrators. Credentialing for privileges in
hospitals and other health care institutions requires references.
Consequently, and in contrast to other industries, it is customary for health
care institutions to provide references for professionals on request.
However, health care professionals frequently perform acts that may give
rise to a prima facie case for negligence, with damages that include physical
harm. The language of § 311, as explicated by comments (d) and (e) and the
accompanying examples, seems to permit a third-party cause of action
against a recommender based on failure to report such acts, which the
recommender may or may not in good faith consider to be negligent.
Fortunately, the three courts that have heard cases against recommenders of
health care workers have failed to find a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation. Two of these courts do not presently accept § 311 as law.
The third court defined negligent misrepresentation as omission of mention
of bad acts, as opposed to affirmative praise. These decisions are discussed
below. Nonetheless, decisions in cases unrelated to health care in some
large states suggest that their courts might rule otherwise. Such rulings
would, in my opinion, create a chaotic situation and would impair medical
care.
In this articleI I shall (1) explain the system of credentialing that
necessitates exchange of information, including references (2) discuss the
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parameters of duty to provide accurate information in the medical context,
and (3) propose appropriate legal boundaries for such a duty.
I. THE NATURE OF MEDICAL STAFF MEMBERSHIP AND THE
CREDENTIALING PROCESS
Residency and credentialing are two institutions that are unique to the
medical profession. Residency is a formal, structured program lasting
several years. It constitutes a transition between school and independent
practice. States typically require some residency training for medical
licensure, 2 and successful completion of a residency program ordinarily is
required as a prerequisite for obtaining hospital privileges. Residency has
characteristics of both an educational program and of employment,
constituting "the transitional phase between the pure academics of medical
school and the realities of medical practice." 3 Residents combine medical
practice under supervision of senior doctors with formal academic exercises
that include gradually increased responsibilities. Satisfactory completion of
each year's work is required for promotion. Residency programs must
certify that their graduates are able to practice their medical specialty
competently and independently.
4
I. Several terms used in this paper may differ from ordinary or legal usage. This is
done for purposes of defining classes of actors in a brief, non-awkward manner.
"Physician" also denotes dentists, podiatrists, psychologists, and other doctoral level
professionals who may practice independently in a hospital setting.
"Hospital" also denotes all institutions that share the regulatory requirements for
physician credentialing to be discussed in this article. Such institutions include, inter
alia, nursing homes, outpatient surgical centers, and outpatient clinics under the aegis of
comprehensive health care institutions.
"Employee" also denotes all physicians who work under institutional supervision,
including actual employees, independent contractors, residents, independent physicians
with privileges, etc.
2. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2096 (West 2003); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16,
§ 1321 (2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 60.3 (2000).
3. Interfaith Med. Ctr. v. Sabiston, 527 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
4. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., COMMON PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS 10 (2007), http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite//dutyHours
/dh-dutyHoursCommonPR.pdf.
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The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME),
which supervises and accredits American residency programs,5 has explicit
requirements for formal evaluation of residents. Reviews by faculty,
patients, peers, self, and other professional staff of residents' performance as
"doctors-in-training" are maintained in residents' files. 6 However, in
addition to their educational capacity, residents are also employees of the
hospitals where they are in training, 7 which makes them eligible for
workers' compensation benefits.8 In fact, New York courts recognize the
status of residents as both students and employees.
9
Residents, as students, invariably make errors that are recognized and
documented in their evaluations. Further, resident work, by its very nature,
results in a large number of evaluations since residents receive multiple
evaluations with variation in quality and accuracy from each of the services
through which they rotate. This can result in the existence of arguably
unjustified and unrepresentative negative statements of opinion in residents'
records. The resulting negative information present in residents' files raises
an issue regarding what should be reported in employment references during
the credentialing process to avoid liability for misrepresentation.
Credentialing is a formal process that provides a basis for hospitals to
supervise the physicians who treat patients in them. Many physicians are
neither employed by, nor compensated by, the hospitals to which they admit
patients. Regardless of whether they are employees, independent
contractors, or receive no compensation, attending physicians must belong to
the medical staff of any hospital in which they have responsibility for patient
5. The ACGME is a private organization that "evaluates and accredits medical
residency programs in the United States." ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED.
EDUC., THE ACGME AT A GLANCE 1, http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/newsRoom
/ataglance.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). It is operated by a board appointed by its
member organizations: the American Board of Medical Specialties, the American
Hospital Association, the American Medical Association, the Association of American
Medical Colleges, and the Council of Medical Specialty Societies. Id.
6. Easaw v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 537 N.Y.S.2d 944, 948-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
7. Samper v. Univ. of Rochester Strong Mem'l Hosp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 958, 961 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987) ("[T]he residency program was both a job and an educational prerequisite
to the career goals of the plaintiffs.").
8. Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hosp., 140 N.E. 694 (N.Y. 1923).
9. See Easaw, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49; see Samper, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 961; see also
Allawi v. State Univ. of New York, slip op. 40502(U) at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 15, 2002).
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care. As such, the medical staff grants its physicians privileges that
specifically denote what procedures the physician may perform and on
which categories of patients they may perform them. The Joint Commission
for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)10 evaluates
hospitals' procedures in granting medical staff membership and privileges,
collectively called credentialing, and ensures hospitals' compliance with
those procedures.
JCAHO is a non-governmental organization 1 whose accreditation is
required for reimbursement by Medicare and by many private insurance
companies for inpatient care. JCAHO requires that the hospitals and other
health-care organizations it accredits have "an organized, self-governing
medical staff that provides oversight of care, treatment, and services
provided by practitioners with privileges."' 12 Hospital by-laws must define
the criteria and qualifications for appointment to the medical staff' 3 and must
describe the entire credentialing process.14
As part of the credentialing process, "current competence . . . is
verified in writing by peers knowledgeable about the applicant's
professional performance."' 5 This written evaluation must, at a minimum,
document "the applicant's actual clinical performance in general terms, the
satisfactory discharge of his or her professional obligations as a medical staff
member, and his or her ethical performance." 16 Privileges must be renewed
10. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGs., FACTS ABOUT
THE JOINT COMMISSION, http://www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/FactSheets
/joint commission_facts.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
11. Id. The members of JCAHO include the American College of Physicians, the
American College of Surgeons, the American Dental Association, the American Hospital
Association, and the American Medical Association.
12. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK MS-6 (2007)
[hereinafter JCAHO HANDBOOK].
13. Id.
14. Id. at MS-8.
15. Id. (emphasis added). The discussion of this standard implies that these peers are
physicians at institutions at which the applicant works or has worked, as it recommends
that the hospital obtain data from these peers about the volume of the physician's
experience.
16. Id.atMS-18.
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at least every two years.' 7 JCAHO mandates that recommendations from
peers in the same professional discipline as the applicant be used as part of
the basis for the initial granting of privileges. Peer recommendations are
used to recommend individuals for the renewal of clinical privileges when
insufficient practitioner-specific data are available. 18 Additionally, federal
law requires that hospitals must access the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB) each time they grant or renew privileges.' 9 The NPDB is a registry
maintained by the Bureau of Health Professionals of the Health Resources
and Services Administration of the Federal Department of Health and
Human Services. 20 Appropriate organizations must report all malpractice
payments, adverse licensure actions, and actions that restrict clinical
privileges to the NPDB. The JCAHO also requires, as a standard of
accreditation, that hospitals access the NPDB whenever they grant or renew
privileges.2 1 Once credentialed, physicians who practice within a hospital
are subject to rules and supervision. For example, they are responsible to a
supervisor, who is usually the department chair. Nonetheless, the medical
staff relationship does not constitute employment.
22
17. JCAHO HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at MS-20.
18. 1d. at MS-25.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 11135 (2006).
20. Id. § 11101.
21. JCAHO HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at MS-15, 20, 21.
22. First, the medical staff relationship has its basis in the hospital by-laws, and not a
collective bargaining or employee-specific agreement. Second, medical staff members
may enjoy statutory rights not granted to employees. New York, for example, precludes
hospitals from taking adverse actions against a physician's privilege without extending to
him the protections specified in its by-laws. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-b(l)
(McKinney 2007)
It shall be an improper practice for the governing body of a hospital
to ... exclude or expel a physician ... from staff membership in a
hospital or curtail, terminate or diminish in any way a physician's...
professional privileges in a hospital, without stating the reasons
therefor, or if the reasons stated are unrelated to standards of patient
care, patient welfare, the objectives of the institution or the character
or competency of the applicant."
Id. See also Gelbard v. Genesee Hosp., 664 N.E.2d 1240, 1240 (N.Y. 1996). Depending
on the state, medical staff membership with clinical privileges may constitute an
2008]
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The requirements for hospitals to obtain references (as well as additional
background information, as available, for example, by checking the NPDB)
may be based on state statute as well as on JCAHO regulations. Such is the
case in New York.23 For example, prior to granting a physician privileges,
hospitals must request information from all hospitals to whose staff the
physician previously belonged regarding any adverse actions those hospitals
took against the physician in question. 24 New York imposes a
corresponding duty upon hospitals to respond to such requests. 2 Other
states require investigation of physicians prior to admission to the medical
staff or the granting of privileges; California, for example, uses the
prevailing standards of JCAHO in this regard.26
Because of the relationships between hospitals and physicians and the
obligations that they entail, hospitals and their agents frequently transmit
evaluative information to other hospitals and their agents. The remainder of
this article discusses whether inaccurate transmission of such information
creates an obligation to parties other than the hospital receiving the
information.
enforceable contract between a hospital and a physician or may impose a unilateral non-
contractual obligation on the hospital or the physician, see Janda v. Madera Cmty. Hosp.,
16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184-86 (E.D. Cal. 1998) for a discussion of this issue, but it
usually does not involve compensation. Additionally, medical staff membership differs
from an employment relationship in that a physician is not an agent of a hospital by virtue
of having privileges there, and the hospital is not vicariously liable for a physician's
activities at that hospital by virtue of granting a physician privileges. See Megrelishvili v.
Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 739 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (quoting
Raschel v. Rish, 488 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)).
23. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, §§ 405.4(b)(4)-(5), 405.6(b)(7) (2006).
24. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-k(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2008).
25. Id. § 2805-k(4).
26. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 32128(a)(2) (West 2007), CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 22 § 71503 (2007).
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II. DUTIES To THIRD PARTIES IN WRITING EMPLOYMENT REFERENCES
A. Relationship Between Negligent Hiring/Credentialing and Negligent
Misrepresentation
Since hospitals have a duty to investigate physicians to whom they give
privileges, it is logical to assign responsibility to providers of employment
references for making them accurate and meaningful. This requires that
evaluators face some form of sanction for providing inaccurate references
and establishes the basis of an inquiry regarding to whom recommenders are
responsible, and what they must do to make references accurate and
meaningful.
B. The Role of Restatement (Second) Torts § 311.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 reads as follows:
§ 311. Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm
(I) One who negligently gives false information to another is
subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by
the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where
such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be
put in peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise
reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
2 7
Liability for negligent misrepresentation under § 311 to third parties who
incur physical harm requires nothing more than reasonable reliance on a
false statement. The plain language of the Restatement does not require the
information provider to intend that the receiving party rely on the
information, or that the provider foresee that physical harm may result.
Employment references for physicians routinely contain factual and
evaluative statements that, if untrue, may lead to third-party harm, even if
that harm is unforeseeable. This raises two important questions: First, does
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1977) (emphasis added).
28. Although, § 311 does not state that the physical harm must be foreseeable, this
seems to be implied, since proximate cause is required to impute liability for a negligent
act, and foreseeability is implied in proximate cause. In fact, comments d and e to § 311
emphasize the high standards to which an actor is held when he contemplates reliance on
his statement. These comments read:
2008]
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§ 311 tacitly imply a requirement for foreseeability, inasmuch as this is
generally considered to be an element of proximate causation? Second, if §
d. Care in ascertaining facts and forming judgment. Where the actor
furnishes information upon which he knows or should realize that the
security of others depends, he is required to exercise the care of a
reasonable man under the circumstances to ascertain the facts, and
the judgment of a reasonable man in determining whether, in the light
of the discovered facts, the information is accurate. His negligence
may consist of failure to make proper inspection or inquiry, or of
failure after proper inquiry to recognize that the information given is
not accurate.
Illustration:
8. The A Boiler Insurance Company undertakes as part of its services
to inspect the boiler of B. It issues a certificate that the boiler is in
good condition for use. In reliance upon this certificate, B uses the
boiler. The boiler bursts, owing to a defect which a reasonably
careful inspection would have disclosed. Explosion of the boiler
wrecks the adjacent building of C and causes bodily harm to him.
The A Company is subject to liability to C for his bodily harm and
the wrecking of his building caused by the explosion of the boiler.
e. Care in use of language. The negligence for which the actor is
liable under the statement in this Subsection consists in the lack of
reasonable care to furnish accurate information. It is, therefore, not
enough that the actor has correctly ascertained the facts on which his
information is to be based and has exercised reasonable competence
in judging the effect of such facts. He must also exercise reasonable
care to bring to the understanding of the recipient of the information
the knowledge which he has so acquired.
Illustration:
9. The A Boiler Insurance Company undertakes as part of its service
to inspect the boiler of B. The A Company makes a careful
inspection, and correctly concludes that the boiler is unsafe. Through
the negligence of its clerk, it issues a certificate which, while
correctly stating all the defects in the boiler, gives the misleading
impression that the boiler is nevertheless safe. In reliance on the
certificate, B continues to use the boiler, which bursts because of the
defects and wrecks the adjacent building of C, causing bodily harm to
C. The A Company is subject to liability to C for his bodily harm and
the wrecking of his building.
§ 311, cmt. d, e; illus. 8, 9.
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3 11 creates an exception to the need for foreseeability either as an element
of duty or an element of causation, should it be applicable to medical
employment references? These questions are better answered in light of
existing case law applying § 311 to employment references. A discussion of
these cases follows below.
C. Decisions Based on § 311: Randi W. and Related Cases
There are several reported decisions where liability is imputed to a third
party for negligent misrepresentation for failure to accurately disclose
negative information regarding a prospective employee. In Gutzan v. Altair
Airlines, the first reported case to address this issue, the defendant was an
employment agency. 29 A jobseeker told the defendant that he had been
incarcerated on the basis of unsubstantiated charges of rape while serving in
the United States Army.3 ° He had, in fact, been convicted of rape, and the
defendant would have learned this had it investigated the matter. 31 The
defendant agency placed the applicant in a position as a data processor,
where he subsequently engaged in inappropriate sexual activity first of a
nonviolent nature, but culminating in rape. The employment agency was
found liable to the victim for negligent misrepresentation based on § 31 1.33
In Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins,34 the defendant, Golden Spread
Council (GSC), which oversaw local Boy Scout troops, recommended Estes
as a scoutmaster without reporting to the new troop knowledge that Estes
may have molested a child. The troop retained Estes.36 Estes then
persuaded the child who he had been accused of molesting to switch to the
new troop, and molested him again. A lawsuit filed on behalf of the child
against GSC alleged that GSC had a duty to report the prior molestation
29. Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, 766 F.2d 135, 136 (3d Cir. 1985).
30. See id. at 137.
31. Seeid. at 138.
32. See id. at 137-38.
33. See id.
34. Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. 1996).
35. Id. at 289.
36. Id.
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when recommending Estes to the new troop. GSC had not actually hired
Estes, so it could not be sued under a negligent hiring doctrine. 37 Although
the majority turned to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302(b)38 to find that
GSC owed a duty to the child,39 the dissent observed that the duty described
by the court was actually that described in § 311.40 This seems to be the first
suggestion of the possibility of liability based on § 311 by an employer
supplying a recommendation.
The highly publicized case Randi W. v. Muroc attempted to solve the
problem of ascribing a duty of care to a third party by developing a theory of
indirect reliance. 41 While working as an assistant principal at a middle
school in the Livingston Union School District in Livingston, California,
Robert Gadams allegedly molested the thirteen-year-old plaintiff. 42  It
became known that Gadams had been relieved or forced to resign from
employment at three other California school districts, specifically Muroc,
Mendota, and Golden Plains, for various acts of sexual touching and other
inappropriate behavior towards middle school students. 43  These three
districts, all named defendants in this case, each provided very positive
employment references for Gadams, at least two of which specifically
praised his interaction with students.44 The California Supreme Court held
37. Id. at 290.
38. Id. at 291-92.
39. Id. Section 302 states, "[a] negligent act or omission may be one which involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the foreseeable action of the other, a
third person, an animal, or a force of nature." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302
(1977) (emphasis added).
40. Golden Spread Council, 926 S.W.2d at 295 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
41. Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 584 (Cal. 1997).
42. Id. at 585.
43. Id. at 585-86.
44. See id. The writer from Mendota wrote that he exhibited "'genuine concern' for
students and [had] 'outstanding rapport' with everyone, and concluded, 'I wouldn't
hesitate to recommend Mr. Gadams for any position!' An official from Golden Plains
stated that he "would recommend him for almost any administrative position he wishes to
pursue." The letter from Medoc cited him for helping to make the school "a safe, orderly
and clean environment for students and staff." It recommended Gadams "for an assistant
principal position or equivalent position without reservation." Id.
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the defendants liable to the plaintiff for failing to warn Livingston of
Gadams's prior history of sexual acts toward students.45 It found a duty of
care under § 311.46 It held that, in California, "the general rule is that all
persons have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured
as the result of their conduct." ' 47  It applied the Rowland criteria of
"foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury . . . the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, [and] the policy of preventing future harm. 48 Rejecting the need
for foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff49 or the need for a special
relationship between plaintiff and defendant,50 the Randi W. court held that:
consistent with Restatement Second of Torts sections 310 and 311 ...
the writer of a letter of recommendation owes to third persons a duty
not to misrepresent the facts in describing the qualifications and
character of a former employee, if making these misrepresentations
would present a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical injury to the
third persons. In the absence, however, of resulting physical injury,
or some special relationship between the parties, the writer of a letter
of recommendation should have no duty of care extending to third
persons for misrepresentations made concerning former employees.
In those cases, the policy favoring free and open communication with
prospective employers should prevail.
5 1
The court then concluded that the letters, as written, contained
misrepresentations.
[W]e view this case as a "misleading half-truths" situation in which
defendants, having undertaken to provide some information regarding
45. Id. at 582.
46. Randi W., 929 P.2d at 591. The court also found a duty of care under
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 (intentional misrepresentation resulting in physical
harm). Id.
47. Id at 588 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)).
48. Id. (quoting Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 629 (Cal. 1986)) (emphasis omitted).
49. Id. at 588-89 (quoting Ballard, 715 P.2d at 629).
50. Id. at 588 (citing Rowland, 443 P.2d at 563).
51. Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
2008]
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Gadams's teaching credentials and character, were obliged to disclose
all other facts which "materially qualify" the limited facts disclosed.
... [H]aving volunteered this information, defendants were obliged to
complete the picture by disclosing material facts regarding charges
and complaints of Gadams's sexual improprieties.
52
As stated above, the court dealt with the need for reliance by the plaintiff
as an element of misrepresentation by adopting a doctrine of indirect
reliance. The plaintiff relied upon her school district, and the district, in turn,
relied upon the prior employers. This chain of reliance established the duty:
We agree with the [intermediate appellate court's] reliance analysis
[that "it was unnecessary under section 3 11 of the Restatement
Second of Torts for plaintiff to plead her own reliance on defendants'
misrepresentations, as long as the recipient of those
misrepresentations (ultimately, Livingston) reasonably relied on them
in hiring Gadams"] .... Under the Restatement provisions, plaintiff
need only allege that her injury resulted from action that the recipient
of defendants' misrepresentations took in reliance on them. In a case
involving false or fraudulent letters of recommendation sent to
prospective employers regarding a potentially dangerous employee, it
would be unusual for the person ultimately injured by the employee
actually to "rely" on such letters, much less even be aware of them.
53
Thus, the California Supreme Court found a duty to disclose allegations of
misconduct that were not formally substantiated to third party plaintiffs
about whom the defendant knew nothing. Further, the court emphasized that
"[a]s for public policy . . .[o]ne of society's highest priorities is to protect
children from sexual or physical abuse."
54
52. Randi W., 929 P.2d at 592 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). It is
noteworthy that the court found a duty to disclose "charges and complaints" about
alleged improprieties that were not proven in any sort of hearing or other process, judicial
or otherwise.
53. Id. at 594.
54. Id. at 589 (citing Barela v. Superior Court, 636 P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1981)
(describing the duty of all citizens to protect children from sexual abuse); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11166 (describing the duty to report suspected child abuse)). The court might
have satisfied this desideratum by finding a cause of action in negligence per se, based on
violations of statutes requiring that child abuse be reported. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
11166 (duty to report suspected child abuse); CAL. EVID. CODE § 699 (West 2000)
(definition of per se negligence). The California negligence per se statute limits
negligence to members "of the class of persons for whose protection the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was adopted." CAL. EVID. CODE § 699. The court, however, held
that the class for whose protection the child abuse statute was adopted included only
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A subsequent New Mexico case closely followed the reasoning in Randi
W.55 In Davis v. Board of County Commissioners, a jail guard resigned
rather than face a disciplinary hearing for sexually assaulting female
56prisoners. He was subsequently hired as a psychiatric mental health
technician by a nearby hospital to which the jail had sent a glowing letter of
recommendation5 7 The employee then sexually and physically abused a
patient at the hospital.58 Citing Randi W. and Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 302 (Risk of Direct or Indirect Harm), the court held that the jail may be
liable for negligent misrepresentation. The court emphasized, in contrast
to the Randi W. court, that the facts were confirmed by an investigative
report that showed "far more than mere gossip or innuendo." 60 It also
established a standard indicating that "if the [employer] does speak, he must
disclose enough to prevent his words from being misleading" 61 and
those children under the custodial care of those with a duty to report, Randi W., 929 P.2d
at 595, and the plaintiff had not been under the custodial care of the defendants. The
dissent would have construed the statute broadly, "to include all children who foreseeably
could be protected from abuse by compliance with its provisions." Randi W., 929 P.2d at
596 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 11164(b)
(West 2000)). The dissenting justice observed that the Reporting Act states its legislative
purpose, saying, "[t]he intent and purpose of this article is to protect children from
abuse." Randi W, 929 P.2d at 596. This statutory construction is narrower and less
tortured than the theory of indirect reliance that the majority concocted to bring this
action under § 311, and it still would have achieved the court's instrumental objective.
55. Davis v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1174 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
56. Id. at 1175-76.
57. Id. at 1176.
58. Id. at 1175.
59. Id. at 1178-80.
60. Id. at 1179.
61. Davis, 987 P.2d at 1177 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 738 (5th ed. 1984)).
2008]
325 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. XXIV:312
emphasized the important public policy consideration of "full and accurate
disclosure regarding employees with violent and dangerous propensities."
62
Recent cases based on Pennsylvania and Georgia law have also permitted
causes of action against suppliers of references based on § 311.63 In each of
these cases, a positive recommendation from a former employer explicitly or
implicitly misrepresented a job applicant's misconduct. The hirer, relying
upon the recommendation, hired the employee, who then perpetrated a
similar act at the new job, resulting in harm to the plaintiff. In each case, the
plaintiff sought to sue the former employer who supplied the references. In
some cases, however, the current employer may not have been not liable for
the injuries because the conduct occurred outside the scope of
employment.6 4 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
liable for an employee's conduct only if the employee performed the tortious
62. Id. at 1181. Note that all of the cases discussed to this point have focused on
sexual or otherwise dangerous situations. In the medical context, however, we will
discuss the duty to report acts performed by individuals without violent propensities.
63. See Wawrzynek v. Statprobe, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 474, 486 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(denying in part defendant's motion to dismiss because defendant "was on notice that the
negligence claim was based on the theories of negligent misrepresentation and negligent
undertaking" when medical product approved by the United States Food and Drug
Administration on the basis of defendant's false information resulted in injury to the
plaintiff); Govea v. City of Norcross, 608 S.E.2d 677, 684-85 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding genuine issue of material fact when former employer of a police officer who
gave his gun to a minor to play with whereupon said minor shot himself, failed to
disclose information pertaining to the officer's dismissal, in part, for careless handling of
weapon, to the officer's current employer); Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 876 A.2d 885,
888 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (involving a woman who sued former employee that
provided false information to then-current employee that led to firing).
64. See, e.g., Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763-64 (5th Cir. 2005)
Under Texas law, a principal "is vicariously liable for the torts of [his agents] committed
in the course and scope of their employment." "To find that the employee acted within
the scope of employment, the action of the employee must be: (1) within the general
authority given him; (2) in furtherance of the employer's business; and (3) for the
accomplishment of the object for which the employee was employed." Moreover, "to be
within the scope of employment, the conduct must be of the same general nature as that
authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized."
(Internal citations omitted); see also, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769
P.2d 948, 949 (Cal. 1989); Lunn v. Yellow Cab Co., 169 A.2d 103, 104 (Pa. 1961);
Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Palladino, 580 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Ga. 2003).
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action in furtherance of the employer's goals.65 The assets of the employees
(who included a police officer, a public school administrator, and a menial
hospital employee) likely lacked the assets necessary to sustain a large
judgment. This would leave the supplier of the recommendation as the only
potential defendant with sufficiently deep pockets to satisfy a substantial
award. The use of a negligence cause of action (such as negligent
misrepresentation based on § 311) rather than, or in addition to, a cause of
action involving intentional misrepresentation, is likely to have brought the
judgment under the umbrella of events covered by the former employer's
insurance. 66 In the health care industry, as in the situations leading to the
cases above, lawsuits against third-party defendants are likely to be
motivated by the desire of an injured party to find a defendant financially
able to compensate her for damages. As in these other cases, corporate or
government employers of someone who supplies a recommendation are
more likely to be able to provide such compensation than a recommended
person who goes on to cause the injury somewhere else.
California restricts third-party liability for references to cases involving
both physical injury and strong public policy considerations; damages based• • 67
solely on economic injury are excluded. Yet, many medical negligence
claims involve economic and emotional damages, as well as damages to
compensate for physical harm. Indeed, the non-medical costs often dwarf
65. See John R., 769 P.2d at 953 ("[A]n employer's liability extends to torts of an
employee committed within the scope of his employment .... This includes willful and
malicious torts as well as negligence." (quoting Martinez v. Hagopian, 227 Cal.Rptr. 763,
766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)); Id. ("Whether a tort was committed within the scope of
employment is ordinarily a question of fact; it becomes a question of law, however,
where the undisputed facts would not support an inference that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment." (citing Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch.Dist., 176
Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)); see also Carnegie v. J.P. Phillips, Inc., 815
N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
66. Insurance coverage of punitive damages is precluded in California as contrary to
public policy because forcing the insured to pay "punish[es] the defendant and [deters]
future misconduct by making an example of the defendant." PPG Indus. v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 656 (Cal. 1999). Furthermore, casualty policies may exclude
intentional torts from coverage. See, e.g., EMASCO Ins. Co. v. Diedrich, 394 F.3d 1091,
1094-95 (8th Cir. 2005). The moral hazard involved in indemnifying others for
intentional acts they might commit is obvious.
67. See Gawara v. United States Brass Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 670 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (citing Randi W., 929 P.2d at 584 and stating "Randi W. is factually
distinguishable. Unlike [Gawara], Randi W. involved a claim of physical injury to a
person."); see also Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 569 (Cal. 1993).
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the medical costs. Section 311 appears to sanction at least pecuniary
damages when the tort caused physical injury as well. 68 However, no known
case has addressed the issue of whether liability under § 311 extends to non-
physical damage that accompanies physical damage.
D. Contrary Decisions
But not all courts have assigned third-party liability to former employers
who provided references for tortfeasors, in favor of adhering to more
traditional interpretations of duties in tort to third parties. For example, in
Cohen v. Wales, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in a case
factually similar to Randi W., found no third-party liability by a
recommender who had failed to report sexual misconduct by a school
employee. 69 The court found that the former employer owed no duty to the
plaintiff unless the defendant had a special relationship with "either the
person who threatens harmful conduct or the foreseeable victim." 70 This
doctrine was recently followed by a federal district court in New York,
pursuant to New York law, in a case regarding negligent referrals.
71
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Hawaii declined to find third-party
liability against a union that recommended employment of a man whom it
knew had been imprisoned for homosexual sexual assault 72 when that man
then raped a male co-worker. 73 In granting summary judgment, the court
found that the union (which routinely recommended employees to ship
owners) owed no duty either to the shipping line or, a fortiori, to the
plaintiff, to screen applicants.74
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311, cmt. d, e, illus. 8, 9. As an
example, comment e, illustration 9 states, "The A Company is subject to liability to C for
his bodily harm and the wrecking of his building caused by the explosion of the boiler."
69. Cohen v. Wales, 518 N.Y.S.2d 633, 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
70. 1d. at 634.
71. See Estevez-Yalcin v. Children's Village, 331 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) ("[T]he mere recommendation of a person for potential employment is not a proper
basis for asserting a claim of negligence where another party is responsible for the actual
hiring." (quoting Cohen, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 634)).
72. See Janssen v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 731 P.2d 163, 164 (Haw. 1987).
73. Id. at 165.
74. Id. at 166.
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In Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, a Michigan court decided a case in
which an employee previously terminated by a former employer for violent
behavior, beat to death another employee while working for a subsequent
employer. 75 The plaintiff alleged that the former employer had a duty to
disclose to the subsequent employer the history of the employee's
violence. 76 The court stated that a party cannot be said to owe a "duty to
protect another party who is endangered by a third person unless there exists
some special relationship between the first party and either the dangerous
person or the potential victim." 77 The court determined that the facts of the
case did not "indicate an event so foreseeable as to warrant the imposition of
a duty."
78
Taking note of the cases discussed in this section, an Illinois court
declined to recognize a cause of action for "negligent referral" in a case not
involving physical harm to the defendant.79 Finally, a Washington case
between two school districts80 involved a complicated series of events in
which the Richland School District sued the Mabton School District for
negligent misrepresentation in failing to disclose that the employee had been
accused of child molestation and had resigned from his original position as a
condition for the charges being dropped. The court rejected the Randi W.
precedent and declined to apply § 311 as a basis for negligent
misrepresentation. 82
75. Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, 459 N.W.2d 100, 101 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 102.
78. Id. at 103.
79. Neptuno Treuhand-und Verwaltungsgesellschaft GMBH v. Arbor, 692 N.E.2d
812, 820 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
80. Richland Sch. Dist. v. Mabton Sch. Dist, 45 P.3d 580, 583 (Wash. Ct. App.
2002).
81. Id. at 584.
82. See id at 587. The court continued and stated "Richland [failed] to establish as a
matter of law that Mabton owed it a duty under common law negligence principles to
include the dismissed charges of child molestation and the reprimands in [the
employee's] letters of recommendation." Id. at 589.
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These cases follow the traditional common law principle that, absent a
special relationship, there is no affirmative duty to warn others of danger. It
should be noted, however, that they are distinguishable from Randi W. as
none of them is based on affirmative misrepresentation of the former
employee's character.
83
E. Analytical Paradigm for the Randi W. Family of Cases
1. The Paradigmatic Situation
Finding a third-party duty of care in a case such as Randi W. requires a
detailed chain of inference, which is summarized in Table 1.
Table t: Chain of inference in § 311 cases involving employment references
In order for victim W to establish a breach of duty against R, the supplier of an employment
recommendation, the following elements must be satisfied:
1) Employee, working under the supervision or auspices of employer #1 in a specified
role
2) Committed an initial act or omission A,
3) In circumstances that are either
a) Under the color of his vocational role or
b) Under circumstances that caused his employer to discipline him
4) Act A, is reasonably included in the category of acts AA
5) Either:
a) Acts in category AA can cause injury (not necessarily physical harm)
to a victim, or
b) Such acts can foreseeably cause physical harm
6) And one of the following applies to acts in category AA:
a) Most persons in the employee's role would not perform such an act
b) Public policy warrants strict liability for these acts
7) An employee that performs an act in category AA is predisposed to perform other
such acts
8) An evaluator, who may be the employer, his agent, or unrelated to the employer,
supplied a reference for the employee to employer #2
9) The evaluator knew or should have known of A, and either
a) Failed to inform employer #2 of A,, or
b) Was aware of the employee's predisposition to perform acts in
category AA and failed to inform employer #2 of this predisposition
10) Employer #2 accepted the employee as a supervisee (employee, independent
contractor, awardee of clinical privileges, etc.)
It) Employer #2 relied on the misrepresentation described in Step 9 in accepting the
employee
12) Later, the employee, under color of his role under employer #2's supervision
13) Committed a second bad act A2, which act either
a) Fell within category AA, or
b) Fell within category BB, if individuals with a predisposition to
perform acts in AA also have a predisposition to perform acts in BB,
and
14) Which caused physical harm to a victim
This chain of inference is either explicitly or implicitly followed in Randi
W. and related cases. Proof of all of these elements is necessary and
83. See John Ashby, Employment References: Should Employers Have an
Affirmative Duty to Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring Prospective Employers, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 140 (2004).
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sufficient for the establishment of a breach of duty under § 311. The terms
"employee" and "employer" are used broadly to denote any vocational
relationship involving supervision, and do not imply a legal employment
relationship.
Elements one and two of the paradigm are self-explanatory. Element
three stipulates that the bad act that requires reporting occurs under one of
two circumstances: either the act must occur under color of employment
(not necessarily within the scope of employment), or it must occur under
circumstances that caused the employer to discipline the employee. In
Randi W., Gadams' acts while working for the recommending school
districts were performed against students under his supervision in the
context of his employment role. Although these acts were not performed
within the scope of his employment, they still satisfy element three. Such
acts clearly suffice to alert employers. Had Gadams performed a similar bad
act totally unrelated to his employment, but which resulted in discipline by
his employer, this would have satisfied this element, for the same reason.
Element four is also crucial to the analysis. In Randi W., the class of act is
implicitly defined as inappropriate sexual behavior toward minors. Had
Gadams been terminated for embezzlement, it would not have been
reasonable to conclude that subsequent child molestation was foreseeable
from this unless a demonstrable causal link between embezzlement and
inappropriate sexual behavior toward minors existed (see element thirteen
b). But the Randi W. court still might have defined the class of act
differently. For example, it might have defined it as any intentional tort, or
as any act that could be defined as a felony under the California criminal
code. Such a broad definition might seem reasonable to some observers, and
unreasonable to others; the question is whether acts of that class rendered
sexual misconduct against minors foreseeable.
A related issue is whether the definition of the category of acts is defined
as a question of law or a question of fact. Randi W. followed Rowland, and
enactment of a California statute, making it a question of whether a duty is
84
owed. This is a question of law. But foreseeability may be considered
either part of the duty of care or an element of proximate cause. 85
84. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 563-64 (Cal. 1968), quoting CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714(a)
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but
also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care
or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as
the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury
upon himself.
Id.
85. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 230, at 584-85 (2000).
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Conceptually, a negligent defendant "should have foreseen some harm, of
some kind, to some person or property" as a matter of law. 86 "The
foreseeability question left to be determined under the proximate cause rules
is whether he should have foreseen the kind of harm that in fact resulted, and
whether the plaintiff was within the class of persons upon whom such harm
might foreseeably befall." 87 Assigning a question to duty or proximate
cause is therefore conclusory rather than descriptive. But while duty is that
element that is decided by the court as a matter of law, proximate cause, on
the other hand, is decided by the factfinder. In addition, Rowland seems to
extend the question of foreseeability and defines the relevant consideration
of duty to be the "foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff," rather than
foreseeability of a specific harm to the plaintiff.
88
[A]II the issues in a negligence case-negligence itself, cause in fact,
and proximate cause, even contributory negligence-can be phrased
as questions of duty. The judge who wishes to take over the case
from the jury can easily express the issue as one of duty. Ideally,
therefore, a duty can be cast as a rule of law rather than as a decision
about whether the particular actions of a particular defendant should
be actionable.
89
As a result, a judge following the Rowland precedent may find a wide
scope of duty that is not necessarily based on reasonable empirical
considerations. Moreover, such a finding may be limited only by appellate
review or legislative oversight.
Element five asserts that the act the evaluator failed to report must, in fact,
be a bad act. Thus, for example, failure to report the result of a
psychological test required for the original employment would therefore not
be required as a duty to the third party. This element is implicit in the Randi
W. line of cases, in that the employees all committed intentional or reckless
acts, but the element is not explicitly stated.
I propose as a sixth element that the bad act be one or a series of acts that
most people in the employee's position would not perform, even as a
negligent act. It may seem superfluous to impose such a requirement when
86. Id. § 182, at 448.
87. Id.
88. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564, superseded by CAL. PENAL CODE § 847 (2008), as
recognized in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 72 (Cal. 1990).
89. DOBBS, supra note 85, § 226, at 578.
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the act in question consists of mayhem. But if § 311 were applied to
negligent acts performed by employees whose job entails infliction of some
physical harm to others or placing others in dangerous positions (which has
not yet happened), this element would become highly important. 90
Element seven requires a finding of propensity, which I argue below is
identical to foreseeability in this circumstance. For example, if act A1 does
not predict the subsequent performance of act A2, then failure to report act
A1 cannot be a proximate cause of A2. As with element four, there is a
threshold question of whether a finding of propensity would constitute a
matter of law or a matter of fact. Furthermore, as with element five, this
element is implicit rather than explicit in this line of cases.
Element eight merely defines the scope of who can be a defendant.
9 1
Element nine targets an evaluator who knew or should have known of an
employee's reportable bad acts but failed to inform potential hirers of such
acts. This element addresses two important issues. First, an employer could
not claim ignorance as an excuse when it ignores the employee's bad acts
though voluntarily engaging in an act of willful blindness. Second,
evaluators require guidelines for reporting imperfect knowledge or
unsubstantiated information. In Randi W., there was neither a formal finding
that Gadams had acted inappropriately, nor a disciplinary action against him.
Ultimately, though, the defendants were held liable for failing to report
allegations unsubstantiated by formal findings (the credibility of these
allegations was not discussed in the opinion). Courts that follow Randi W.
will need to establish a threshold of credibility that allegations must reach in
order to create a duty of reportability in recommendations.
Not all accusations of bad acts are true accusations. Regardless of
whether employment references are protected by statutory or common law,
conscientious persons will be inclined to protect the reputations of others
unless there is either convincing evidence of their culpability or formal
findings that substantiate accusations of bad acts. It is disturbing that Randi
W. appears to implicitly require the transmission of unsubstantiated
information. As this field of law develops, the rights and expectations of the
employee must be balanced with those of employers who hired on the basis
of a reference.
In Section III below, the article will propose institutional requirements to
investigate and make findings as to any charges against an employee and to
90. Element 6a will be discussed later in the medical context as the basis for the
problem of overforeseeability. Element 6b's provision on strict liability is also included
in the interest of conceptual completeness.
91. See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 585-86
(Cal. 1997).
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a set of predefined bad outcomes that result from acts of an employee.
Under these circumstances, the institution may exonerate employees, find
them deficient, or declare culpability to be indeterminate on the basis of
available data. This would partially address both the problem of willful
blindness and employers' treatment of unsubstantiated information in
employment references.
Elements ten and eleven address hiring by a subsequent employer who
relied on misleading statements provided by the first employer. The main
issue here is determining what events may comprise an intervening
superseding cause. An intervening superseding cause shields the defendant
from liability by refuting the claim that the subsequent employer was reliant
upon the misrepresentation. Element twelve emphasizes that the extent
of employees' liability is dependent on their access to the victim resulting
from his particular association with the second employer, and his general
vocational role. 92 As in Gutzan, the act need not be carried out in the work
setting; in this case some of the employee's acts giving rise to liability
occurred at a fellow employee's home. 93 On the other hand, plaintiffs
unrelated to the employment situation would not have a cause of action
based on a theory that but for the employer hiring the employee into the
community in which the act took place, the plaintiff would not have been
harmed.
Finally, Element thirteen limits such liability to acts that are in the same or
related classes of acts as the misrepresentation. The problem with defining
the class is discussed above as part of Element four.
2. Special Issues in the Medical Context
In the absence of actual cases, this article constructs hypothetical
scenarios94 to serve as a basis for applying the analytical paradigm to health
care situations. The first is comparable to Randi W.:
92. With the exception of Gutzan, the liable defendants all were employers preceding
the employees' bad acts, or else were agents of the employers. See, e.g., Randi W., 929
P.2d at 585-86; Davis v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1999); Wawrzynek v. Statprobe, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 474, 477-78 (E.D. Pa. 2005);
Govea v. City of Norcross, 608 S.E.2d 677, 680-82 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
93. See Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, 766 F.2d 135, 137-38 (3d Cir. 1985).
94. The vignettes are loosely based on the author's professional observations,
although they did not necessarily result in litigation.
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Carol Cushing
Carol Cushing, M.D. was a neurosurgery resident at Pecos Memorial
Hospital. While working in the hospital on night call, Cushing
punched a first-year resident for changing the television channel in
the residents' lounge. Her punch broke the resident's nose.
Cushing's supervisor, Barbara Brainpicker, M.D., appointed her as
administrative chief resident, approvingly citing her assertiveness. In
this position, Cushing frequently threatened to strike junior residents
and other hospital staff, but never again did so. After her residency,
Cushing took a position at the famed Derry Clinic in Belfast,
California. She was not employed by Derry, but had clinical
privileges at its hospital. She obtained these privileges partly on the
strength of Brainpicker's letter of recommendation. The
recommendation read in part, "Cushing's unique leadership talent
successfully molded nurses, medical students, and junior residents
into a successful team. She was well-liked, and regarded by those she
supervised as firm, but reasonable and fair." Several months after
beginning work at Derry, a nurse on the postoperative floor, Fred
Fragile, refused to remain late at work to care for a patient of
Cushing's, because he wanted to attend his child's school pageant.
Cushing followed him into the street outside of the hospital and struck
him, causing permanent paralysis. Fragile sued Brainpicker and
Pecos Memorial for negligent misrepresentation.
Cushing committed multiple acts of assault, and at least one battery,
during her residency. She was given a recommendation that praised her in
the area in which she was deficient. She subsequently battered a victim in
the place of his new employment. As in John R., Randi W., and other cases
in this series, the circumstances of the battery upon Nurse Fragile are outside
the scope of employment, thereby precluding Derry's liability based on
respondeat superior.95 On the other hand, courts following the traditional
doctrine of disallowing third-party liability absent a special relationship that
was affirmed by New York in Cohen 96 would not hold Pecos and
Brainpicker liable. Moreover, the plaintiff would be unable to recover
damages. Failure to compensate a victim like Nurse Fragile seems unjust.
95. See John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 953 (Cal. 1989); see
also Haybeck v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 944 F. Supp. 326, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding
employer not liable under the tort theory of respondeat superior for failing to inform
employee's sexual partner that employee had the virus that causes AIDS when the
employer was aware that employee has AIDS and was having sex with customers in
employer's online chat room).
96. See Cohen v. Wales, 518 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
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For this reason, Randi W. offers an attractive approach to this problem. Its
main problems, however, concern the foreseeability of the injury to the
particular victim and the length of the chain of proximate causation.
9 7
As the primary tortfeasor, Cushing, may be judgment-proof. Her
intentional tort will not be covered by insurance, and a recent residency
graduate is unlikely to have sufficient assets to cover a large award. The
only remaining possible defendants are Pecos and its agent, Brainpicker, and
there seems little question that they would be liable in a state that follows
Randi W. A court that recognizes a strong enough policy consideration in
preventing sexual assault against children to establish a duty in law98 would
likely find a similarly strong policy consideration in the prevention of
workplace violence.
Situations like the Cushing scenario are less common than situations like
the one that follows:
Raphael Slowfinger
Mordor Medical Center in Mordor, California, hired Raphael
Slowfinger, who had just finished a fellowship in surgical oncology,
to join the senior surgical oncologist, Yetta Yancey, as a junior
associate. Although Mordor's mission included education and
research as well as clinical practice, Slowfinger pointedly confined
his activities to his clinical practice. This grew rapidly, as Slowfinger
had superb rapport with patients and referring physicians, and his
patients generally did well. However, he regularly failed to show up
for teaching assignments and failed to conduct research, even
declining to enter his patients into departmental clinical trials.
Furthermore, he regularly arrived at least an hour late for surgery,
office sessions, and administrative meetings. Yancey developed some
concerns that Slowfinger was too surgically aggressive and was
operating too slowly. She had seen these traits in many other recently
trained physicians, however, and knew that surgical judgment and
speed generally improved as young surgeons gained experience.
Furthermore, she knew that some respectable oncologists would not
97. Would it seem as just to hold Pecos and Brainpicker liable if Cushing left Derry
for Edinburgh Hospital, went from there to Falmouth, and finally ended at Galway
Medical Center, where he struck an employee fifteen years after leaving Pecos? In this
case, could Pecos' letter of recommendation to Derry reasonably be characterized as the
proximate cause of the injury? What if Pecos had sent a letter directly to Galway based
on information in its files ten years after Cushing left, five years after Brainpicker retired,
and five years before an assault on a nurse?
98. See Randi W., 929 P.2d at 589.
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regard Slowfinger's aggressiveness as exceptional. All of
Slowfinger's problems were documented in personnel evaluations, as
well as in a letter Yancey wrote to him, warning that his job would be
in jeopardy if his performance did not improve. Approximately 10%
of that letter dealt with clinical issues, and the rest with his academic
and administrative deficiencies. Yancey became convinced that
Slowfinger's continued presence on the paid staff was incompatible
with Mordor's academic mission. She and the Mordor administration
negotiated Slowfinger's resignation as a paid employee. The
agreement allowed Slowfinger to retain his hospital credentials and
his clinical privileges. Part of the termination agreement was this
letter of recommendation:
Slowfinger worked at Mordor Medical Center (MMC) for three years.
Throughout his service at Mordor he proved to be an indefatigable
worker. He had exceptional rapport with patients, and was
conscientious and attentive in their care. He has the potential to make
a major impact on your program.
Slowfinger then resigned from the Mordor medical staff. He opened
a solo private practice in the exurb of Karakorum, with clinical
privileges at Prester John Hospital (PJH). Yancey sent the letter
quoted above to PJH in response to a request for credentialing
information. In his new practice, Slowfinger's clinical patterns
worsened. Faced with the high cost of running a private practice, he
performed many operations that were not appropriate. Furthermore,
he would operate on patients who were too ill to withstand surgery.
His operating time actually doubled from his operating time at MMC.
Four years after beginning practice in Karakorum, and eleven hours
into a procedure that ordinarily took four hours, Slowfinger lacerated
Valdemar Vick's vena cava, causing him to bleed to death on the
operating table. Vick's estate sued Yancey and MMC for negligent
misrepresentation based on the letters from Yancey to Slowfinger and
PJH, as well as suing Prester John and Slowfinger for medical
malpractice.
Although the Slowfinger hypothetical superficially resembles the Cushing
hypothetical and Randi W., there are several important distinctions. Here,
the act that directly caused the injury arose from negligence, rather than
from an intentional violent act. Such situations are more common in
medical settings than intentional torts like Cushing's. The issue of reliance
is another major distinction. Livingston probably would not have hired
Gadams had his misconduct been known, nor would Derry have granted
privileges to Cushing had it known of her misbehavior. Whether awareness
of the circumstances of Slowfinger's association with Mordor would have
deterred Prester John from granting him privileges is not as clear. His
academic deficiencies may have been irrelevant to a community hospital like
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Prester John. Slowfinger's clinical issues at Mordor most likely reflected
mediocrity rather than incompetence 99 and were, in any event, not
substantiated problems. Slowfinger might have been the best surgical
oncologist that a small exurban community could attract. 0 0 When the act at
the first hospital is negligent, the question of reliance is not as clear as when
the act is intentional.
The most important difference between Slowfinger and Cushing involves
foreseeability. As discussed above, the Randi W. model requires
foreseeability of the second act from the first, and establishes this as a matter
of law.' 0 1 In the context of employment references, the question is whether
it is reasonable to infer the physician's propensity to perform the second bad
act from his having performed the first bad act. If this is reasonable, then the
second act was foreseeable from the first, and a duty to report that act exists.
Conversely, if this is not reasonable, then there is no foreseeability, and no
duty to report that act arises. The proposition, "A physician's act A 2 is
foreseeable as a result of his act A," is thus operationally equivalent to the
proposition, "A physician's act A, demonstrates a propensity to perform act
A2." Hence, this article uses the concepts of foreseeability and propensity
interchangeably. There are many issues that influence foreseeability. It is
possible to take a restrictive approach, an expansive approach, or one or
more intermediate approaches to each of these issues. Each approach is
summarized in Table 2 below.
99. This is stated in arguendo, as part of the hypothetical.
100. In practical terms, both Prester John and Mordor would probably be defendants,
and the issue would be comparative liability. Prester John would maintain that
Slowfinger would not have been accepted to its medical staff had the circumstances been
known, and the issue would rest on the credibility of the principals.
101. See, e.g., Janssen v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 731 P.2d 163, 165 (Haw. 1987)
(refusing to find third-party liability and stating, "[w]e have said that a defendant owes a
duty of care only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with
respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably
dangerous.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Randi W., 929 P.2d at 589-90
(allowing third-party liability).
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Table 2: Issues affecting foreseeability
(Entries in italics denote author's opinion of the desirable legal standard)
Legend: E: Employee; H: Hirer; R: Recommender
EXPANSIVE INTERMEDIATE RESTRICTIVE
PARAMETER CONCEPTION CONCEPTION CONCEPTION
Plaintiff Third party; Third party; special Direct subject of
foreseeable relationship action by
defendant
When During training, Following training In recent years
employee/actor including residency following
performed first and fellowship training
act
Intentionality of Negligent Marked deviation from Intentional
first act by usual practice
employee/actor patterns
(unreported by R)
Certitude Unsubstantiated Substantiated bad act Formalfinding
regarding the first reports with no formal required to
act finding document act
Reporting of Required reporting of Institutional R required No liabilit for
opinions all expressed to develop evaluative non-factual
regarding negative opinions statement for all statements
competence supervisees using
formal criteria
Intentionality of Negligent Marked deviation from Intentional
second act usualpractice
patterns
Where either act Anywhere Under color of Within scope of
is carried out employment employment
Similarity of first Any bad act Similar act (e.g., both Act with identical
and second acts acts involve striking character
another person)
Superseding act None Learns offirst act by E Enough time to
by H become
familiar with
E's
predispositions
As for the relationship of plaintiff to defendant, the law may either restrict
standing to bring a cause of action to persons directly affected by the
defendant (currently no jurisdiction does this), allow a lawsuit against third
persons with a special relationship of care, or allow suit by any third person
foreseeably affected by the negligent action of the defendant. The general
rule is that "[u]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to act, or stands in a
special relationship to the plaintiff, defendants are not liable in tort for a pure
failure to act for the plaintiff's benefit. The fact that the defendant foresees
harm to a particular individual from his failure to act does not change the
general rule."'102  Most states follow this rule, which forms the basis of
102. DOBBS, supra note 85, § 314, at 853.
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decisions such as Cohen. This rule does not apply in those states that accept
§ 311 as law. The question should be whether such jurisdictions should
limit the impact of § 311 with regard to negligent acts in health care
situations. The following hypothetical exemplifies a scenario where the
employee performed the first bad act.
Betty Breeze
Betty Breeze graduated from medical school at age 23 (the usual age
is 26), and never had to study very hard. Faculty evaluations during
the first year of her four-year residency in obstetrics and gynecology
at DeLee Medical Center frequently commented on her immaturity.
At the beginning of her second year, she was asked to evaluate a
patient, but decided to wait until after lunch to see her. The patient
died before Breeze finished her meal. DeLee placed Breeze on
academic probation. However, this incident was an epiphany for her,
and her subsequent performance was exemplary. Breeze opened a
practice in the town of Zephyr, California. DeLee's letter of reference
to Carrier Medical Center there described her as a committed,
conscientious resident-a description that accurately reflected her
performance after the incident. She had no problems and complaints
during her first five years in practice. Then, Breeze was called to
come to Carrier at 2:00 a.m. one morning to attend a patient of hers
who was in labor. She arrived at the hospital 90 minutes later, though
she lived ten minutes away. As a result, a cesarean section for fetal
distress was delayed, allegedly leading to brain damage in the infant.
During the ensuing discovery process, the lawyer for the infant and
her family somehow obtained production of Breeze's complete
personnel file from DeLee. The family sued DeLee for negligent
misrepresentation.
It is during the residency period when physicians receive enough
responsibility that their clinical capabilities can be evaluated. This is also
the period when they first have enough independence to be able to perform
negligent acts. Extensive resident files contain documents dating back to the
beginning of the residency recording residents' deficiencies in judgment and
knowledge at each stage of a residency period. Although the deficiencies
generally diminish or are cured with experience, training, and maturity, the
files remain. The actions of a junior resident do not necessarily create a
propensity to continue the deficiencies documented in their files. A policy
allowing both extensive disclosure of material in resident files and the liberal
construction of this material to show a propensity to perform negligent acts
would disrupt the medical education system, to the detriment of health care.
It would also be unjust to the trainees involved. Therefore, such disclosure
should be severely limited.
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Physicians continue to improve their skills after the completion of
residency, and the acts of an attending physician at one point in his career do
not necessarily indicate a propensity to perform those acts many years later.
For this reason, there should be a time limit (perhaps seven to ten years
would be reasonable) after which a physician's negligent acts are no longer
subject to disclosure in references. Thus, if Cushing had refrained from
workplace violence for ten years, there would have been a conclusive
presumption that she no longer had a propensity towards workplace
violence, cancelling any duty incumbent on Pecos to report it.
In considering the intentionality of first act, Randi W. and the Cushing
hypothetical are distinguishable from the Slowfinger hypothetical in that the
undisclosed bad acts were intentional in the first two cases, and were, at
worst, negligent in the last. Workplace violence and sexual abuse are easily
identifiable. On the other hand, medical malpractice is more difficult to
identify. Often, there are major and sincere disagreements between experts
over whether an act comprises malpractice. Even when a malpractice action
ultimately results in a settlement or a verdict for the plaintiff, reasonable
professionals may disagree that the physician acted in a substandard manner.
The association of intentional acts with a propensity to perform similar
acts seems intuitive, and it is easy to define the class of act. It is reasonable
to assume that a person with a history of even one sexual assault is likely to
do it again; this assumption also seems reasonable to conclude about an
individual who has stricken a co-worker. Negligence, however, is more
protean. Does someone who operates slowly, or someone who negligently
operates for an inappropriate indication, have a greater propensity to injure a
vital structure than other physicians? This is by no means intuitive. A
demonstration that two different kinds of negligence are causally related, or
even correlated, requires inferences that currently cannot be drawn based on
empirical data.
Furthermore, violence and sexual abuse, while unfortunately occurring
more frequently than they should, appear to be the exception and not the
rule. 10 3 By contrast, medical error that gives rise to a prima facie case of
malpractice is so common as to be virtually ubiquitous. 10 4 It is likely that
103. See Amy D. Whitten & Deanne M. Mosley, Caught in The Crossfire:
Employers' Liability for Workplace Violence, 70 Miss. L.J. 505, 505-07 (2000);
Kimberly Smith, Comment, A Plea for Mandatory Disclosure: Urging Michigan's
Legislature to Protect Employees Against Increasing Phenomena of Workplace Violence,
79 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 611, 611 (2002) (summarizing statistics regarding workplace
violence).
104. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 22-44 (University of Chicago
Press 2005), citing Don H. Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, 128 W.J. MED.
279, 360 (1978); Ross M. Wilson, et. al., The Quality in Australian Health Care Study,
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most physicians will perform such an act in the course of a week's work that
entails interviewing and examining over one hundred patients, reviewing
hundreds of laboratory and radiology reports, writing numerous
prescriptions, and making many other clinical decisions. Fortunately, the
vast majority of errors do not lead to adverse consequences. In high-risk
fields such as obstetrics, where medical errors are likely to lead to injuries
whose severity warrants litigation, 10 5 most physicians in the field are sued
and pay judgments. In 2006, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists surveyed its members and found that 89.8% of senior fellows
and junior fellows nationally,' 0 6 and 92.2% of members located in New
York 10 7 had been sued for malpractice during their careers. Additionally,
29.5% and 44%, respectively, had been sued at least four times. Both
nationally and in New York, about one-third of claims led to either
settlement or an adverse verdict. Nationally, 55% of members had claims
opened or closed during the years 2003 to 2005, and 71.8% of New York
members had claims opened or closed during the same time period.
Furthermore, almost one-third of survey respondents nationally, and over
half of the respondents in New York, reported that claims had been filed
against them during residency. 108 Regardless of whether they lead to
163 MED. J. AUSTL. 453, 458 (1995); Lori B. Andrews, et. al., An Alternative Strategy for
Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 295, 309 (1997); To ERR IS
HUMAN-BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Linda T Kohn et al. eds., National
Academy Press 2000); David M. Studdert, et. al., Negligent Care and Malpractice
Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 247, 250 (2000).
105. It is assumed, in arguendo, that most judgments and settlements against
physicians, and obstetric lawsuits, result from the defendants' negligence. In fact, an
undetermined number of these lawsuits suits are settled either to avoid the costs of
litigation or because the defendant or his insurer fears the publicity or the costs of a
verdict that is not based on good scientific evidence. On the other hand, many instances
of negligence that cause injury do not lead to lawsuits.
106. Fellows are Board certified obstetricians and gynecologists of good moral
character who have applied to the College. Junior fellows are, for the most part, residents
and recent graduates of residency who have not attained Board certification, which takes
at least 1.5 years after completing residency.
107. Fellows may base their membership on their home or office address, at their
discretion.
108. Nonda Wilson & Albert L. Strunk, Overview of the 2006 ACOG Survey on
Professional Liability (Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists), Mar.-Apr. 2007, at
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litigation, physicians' alleged errors often are recorded in hospital records.
These records include minutes of educational conferences focused on patient
complications, administrative investigations of adverse patient outcomes,
and complaints by patients, nurses, and other physicians (and responses to
them).
Negligent physician error either foresees too much or too little.
Physicians commit errors throughout their careers, some of which are likely
to result in physical harm. Recommenders are aware of this, as are the
hiring or credentialing authorities to whom a reference is directed. For the
recommender to tell the credentialing authority that a physician is fallible is
not particularly helpful. That a physician is capable of making mistakes is
already understood. As such, it is unreasonable to infer a propensity for
error or for negligence on the basis of the association of two apparently
related events when both the antecedent and the subsequent event are highly
likely to happen. Such a mistaken inference can be termed
"overforeseeability." When overforeseeability exists, it would be unjust to
construe failure to communicate knowledge of the antecedent event as a
proximate cause for the subsequent event, despite the plain meaning of §
311. The discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that medical
negligence overforesees subsequent negligence. Therefore, failure to
transmit the specific nature of known medical errors should not amount to
misrepresentation. A physician who has a large number of complications
may not be a substandard physician; rather, these complications may result
from a practice consisting of patients with an exceptionally high risk for
adverse events.
Only the failure to communicate information that actually identifies
physicians with a propensity to commit medical errors could be construed as
misrepresentation. In the absence of valid models for predicting future
errors from past physician negligence, there is no way for a recommender to
reliably supply such information. 109 However, there are two classes of
negligent acts-not highly likely to occur-that clearly suggest a propensity
for subsequent negligent acts, and which should consequently require
reporting. The first class consists of negligent acts resulting from
physicians' chronic or recurring physical or mental problems. The second
class consists of unusual negligent acts that, by virtue of their nature and
frequency, deviate substantially from the type of negligence normally
expected from a physician. For example, reportable occurrences with regard
to appendectomies might include laceration of the liver during an
109. It should be possible to generate such models through the application of
sophisticated techniques of statistics and social science. To the author's knowledge,
however, such models have not been published.
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appendectomy or a series of several cases in which a ligature came off the
appendiceal stump. 110 The standard for reporting proposed here is not
deviation from the standard of care, but marked deviation from statistically
expected practice patterns.
The requirement to report overforeseeable events can be avoided either by
precluding an extensive duty to report physician acts or by restricting the
classes of subsequent acts for which there is third-party liability. In other
words, one can either have a restrictive approach towards defining the duty
or a restrictive approach to defining proximate cause. The second approach
is more reasonable from a policy standpoint. If reporting requirements are
extensive and explicit, then evaluators' duties are transparent, and they can
reasonably be expected to comply. If the reportable class is smaller but the
actionable class is larger, then recommenders will be called to account for a
greater number of subsequent acts, and they will be subject to second
guessing for their omissions. Furthermore, a broad reporting requirement
provides more information for a recipient hospital to consider in a
credentialing evaluation. As such, third-party causes of action related to §
311 should be allowed for intentional and grossly negligent acts. They
should not be allowed when ordinary negligence is alleged, unless the
physician has a physical or mental impairment or a pattern of unusual acts.
How certain must an evaluator be that a bad act took place in order for the
duty to report the act to vest? Specifically, does an evaluator have a duty to
communicate unsubstantiated charges? This problem is illustrated by the
following scenario:
Morton Mean
Morton Mean was an internist employed by Rue Mort Medical Center
in Styx, California. He prevailed upon the Medical Center to dismiss
his office nurse, Ursula Uvula, for two incidents of administering the
wrong medication. Uvula then reported to the Medical Center
administration that Mean was in the habit of making late night house
calls on his young female patients. The hospital was unable to
substantiate these stories. Nevertheless, Mean resigned following a
conversation with the president of Rue Mort. He moved to Belle
Fourchette and obtained clinical privileges at Fourchette Hospital.
Recommendations provided by Rue Mort to Fourchette described
Mean as a capable, ethical practitioner. Four months later, Mean
impregnated Leona Lonely, a married patient whose husband was on
active duty in Iraq. Lonely later read the rumors of Mean's reputation
in Styx on an Internet chat room for patients who had affairs with
110. The appendix normally lies more than six inches from the liver, and the nature of
this complication makes it highly deviant; ligatures rarely come off appendiceal stumps.
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their physicians. After further investigation, Lonely sued Rue Mort
for negligent misrepresentation for having failed to disclose to
Fourchette Hospital the circumstances behind Mean's departure.
Employers may be happy to accept the resignation of employees who are
accused of inappropriate behavior on the job. An employee's quiet
departure protects the institution's reputation. A school district, for
example, may not want parents to know that it had employed a child
molester. The child molester employee's resignation also saves the
considerable time and expense of a disciplinary process. Finally, the formal
and informal obstacles to proving charges may leave employers uncertain as
to whether they will prevail in a dismissal process. On the other hand,
untrue charges may force employees to resign because they fear loss of
effectiveness or reputation from publicity regarding the charges, or do not
wish to expend the time and money it takes to fight them. Dr. Mean might
have left either to escape discipline for actual sexual activity with patients or
to avoid harm to his reputation caused by persistent rumors.
This sort of situation presents a quandary to the evaluator. On the one
hand, reporting such unsubstantiated charges is protected in most states by
common law or statutory qualified privilege. "' On the other hand,
immunity does not create a duty to report uncertain data. Failure to report
data such as Uvula's accusation against Mean may be motivated by a desire
to avoid informal recriminations or a lawsuit, which would involve
substantial time, expense, and stress for the defendant. Moreover, an
evaluator may sincerely believe that it is unethical and unjust to broadcast
unsubstantiated charges. This article is sympathetic to this point of view.
Rue Mort should not be burdened with a duty to report the accusations
against Dr. Mean. Even if the hospital were uncomfortable in retaining him
on a theory of "when there's smoke, there's fire," Rue Mort should only
have the duty of reporting the "fire," and not the duty of reporting the
"smoke." However, if hospitals may refrain from reporting unsubstantiated
charges that an employee has put persons in their care at physical risk, then
they should have a complementary duty to investigate such charges. A
Gadams or a Mean should not have the opportunity to walk away without a
formal resolution of the charges. This issue is discussed in further detail in
Section III below.
Reporting of opinions regarding competence:
When soliciting references, hospitals generally ask for an evaluation of
the physician's competence. They typically send the evaluator a printed
111. See Cathy A. Schainblatt, Comment, The New Missouri Employer Immunity
Statute: Are Missouri Employers Still Damned if They Do and Damned if They Don't? 44
ST. Louis U. L.J. 693, 722, 722 n. 180 (2000).
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form for the evaluator to complete and return. The form has a list of
professional qualities, such as technical skill and ability to work with others,
and calls for the evaluator to check a box labeled "poor," "fair," "good," or
"excellent" (or, alternatively, as "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory"). There
are spaces for evaluators to make narrative comments if they choose. (See
Appendix A).
Evaluators should not be liable for misrepresentation for opinions,
whether made in a check-off form or conveyed in prose, with two
exceptions. If an opinion contradicts facts that the evaluator knows or
should know, this should constitute misrepresentation. An example of this
would be Brainpicker's praise of Cushing's ability to work with others. The
second exception would be an opinion that contradicts statements the
evaluator made repeatedly and publicly, and which fairly represents the
evaluator's true estimation of the situation. For example, if Yancey had
frequently indicated that she would not allow Slowfinger to operate on her
hamster, then an evaluation stating that Slowfinger's technical skills were
excellent would be a misrepresentation. Otherwise, opinions are too
subjective to allow them to be easily characterized as misrepresentation.
Yancey may believe that Slowfinger is too aggressive or too slow; another
surgical oncologist may not.
Residents and young physicians present a special problem. Their
propensities change with experience and maturity. Breeze's evaluators may
have initially deemed her careless, but her fecklessness resolved itself as she
gained experience and maturity. For this reason, evaluators should not be
held accountable for a duty regarding their opinions of trainees unless they
fail to report a pattern of behavior that markedly deviates from the usual
pattern of behavior among comparable trainees. Another problem is the use
of words of art in narrative evaluations. 112 Reference letters rarely express
negative views in clear language. Among the thousands of employment
references the author has reviewed in evaluating physicians for various
112. The following evaluation was given to a medical student whose grade placed him
in the lowest 5% of those taking the course: Mr. Moriarty performed satisfactorily. He
demonstrated a good fund of knowledge, a sense of responsibility and a motivation to
learn. He involved himself with his patients and participated actively in their care. His
writeups and presentations were satisfactory and showed improvements during the
rotation.
This evaluation used the techniques of adjective inflation and omission of key parameters
(in this case, clinical reasoning ability, which a reader would be expected to see
evaluated). The following passage from another evaluation shows the third technique,
using code words to imply that the student never quite caught on to what was expected of
him: It took Mr. Moriarty a long time to settle in his role as primary caregiver, but in the
final week he was more assertive and presenting [sic] more comfortably.
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positions, fewer than ten have contained frankly adverse comments. These
references, however, are read by professionals who are, or should be,
familiar with the spectrum of language that they employ. The use of "words
of art" alerts the competent and-experienced reader to the recommender's
reservations, even in the absence of an overtly negative comment.
Such reservations are communicated through strategic omission, expected
adjective inflation, and use of euphemisms. Strategic omission consists of
the absence of comment about important parameters of professional
performance. For example, failure of an evaluator to mention a candidate's
ethics or medical judgment may constitute an implicit warning of deficiency.
If the candidate seems otherwise qualified, a hospital considering privileges
should contact the writer to clarify the matter. Also, recommenders inflate
their adjectives. For example, the residency application process requires
official letters of recommendation from United States medical schools.
Typically, the last paragraph of these letters contains a standard evaluative
adjective to denote approximate class rank. 113 Finally, euphemisms are
often used to alert the reader to possible problems. "This candidate is likely
to have a substantial impact on your organization" does not mean that the
evaluator anticipates a positive impact. "Assertive" often means obnoxious
and argumentative. And the recipient of a letter whose writer suggests that
he "would be happy to discuss this candidate by phone" would be remiss if
she accepted the candidate without making that call. These devices are
unlikely to surrender to frankness. They are universal, and a mentor who did
not use them would be reducing his protegees' employment opportunities.
In summary, statements of opinion should rarely be construed as
misrepresentation. In the rare circumstance in which a court finds a prima
facie case for a statement of opinion being a proximate cause of injury, the
jury should hear evidence regarding the language used in expressing
opinions regarding professional qualifications. Jury instructions should
make it clear that the jury is to determine what is communicated to an expert
reader, and not what the plain meaning of the communication would say to a
lay person.
Intentionality of second act:
This question has been discussed supra with intentionality of the first act.
Where either act is carried out:
A bad, or arguably negligent, act can be carried out within the scope of
employment, under color of employment, or outside the context of
113. See infra note 125.
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employment. In most jurisdictions, 14 there is vicarious liability for the
employer only if an act is performed within the scope of employment-that
is, unless it performed in service of the employer's purpose. '15 An act
performed under color of employment is one performed while acting outside
one's vocational capacity, but in circumstances with a nexus to the actor's
employment.' 16 Cushing's assault on Fragile and Mean's sexual relationship
with Lonely occurred under color of employment, as they were performed
against people with whom the actors had professional relationships. It is
reasonable to require reporting of bad acts carried out in the scope of
employment or under color of employment. It is less clear whether an
employer should have a duty to report acts without a nexus to the
employment. If Cushing had beaten his wife or gotten into barroom fights,
Brainpicker should not be held liable for failing to report knowledge of such
information, unless the employer regarded such information as sufficiently
relevant to serve as a basis for disciplinary action. The author is unaware of
any case on point.
114. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 ("An employer is subject to
liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their
employment.") and Comment (b) ("Additionally, respondeat superior is inapplicable
when an employee's tortious conduct does not fall within the scope of employment as
stated in § 7.07(2)."); see also E. Ala. Behavioral Med., P.C. v. Chancey, 883 So. 2d 162,
167 (Ala. 2003); Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Palladino, 580 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Ga. 2003);
Alms v. Baum, 796 N.E.2d 1123 (I11. App. Ct. 2003); Dias v. Brigham Med. Assocs.,
Inc., 780 N.E.2d 447, 452 (Mass. 2002); Trahan-Laroche v. Lockheed-Sanders, Inc., 657
A.2d 417, 419 (N.H. 1995); Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757
(Tex. 2007); but see Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr. 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990)
(scope of employment is one of several factors to be considered in a balancing test).
115. See John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 953 (Cal. 1989).
116. Causes of action in negligent hiring and negligent supervision have been found in
situations in which an injury was committed by a worker outside the location of
employment, working hours, and scope of employment-i.e., not in furtherance of the
employer's interest. See, e.g., Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308
(Tex. 1983) (involving employer that was sent home in his car because he was drunk and
injured plaintiff); Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 563 (W. Va. 1983) (involving
worker who was forced to labor for 27 consecutive hours and fell asleep while driving,
thereby causing accident). This type of situation has been termed as occurring under
"color of employment." See, e.g., Porter v. Nemir, 900 S.W.2d 376, 385 (Tex. App.
1995) (involving employee of rehabilitation center that engaged in inappropriate sexual
behavior with a former patient outside of the center).
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Similarity offirst and second acts:
In order to find that there is a propensity to commit a certain kind of act,
there must be some similarity between the acts. In T W. v. City of New
York, a negligent hiring case, a criminal record that included "armed
robbery, assault, theft, burglary, and possession of a controlled substance" 
1 17
was held to create a propensity to sexually assault a minor girl.118 The
opinion suggests no empirical basis for finding foreseeability, and the author
believes that the case was wrongly decided. A finding of foreseeability
should be based on one of two possible circumstances. The first is a
situation in which the acts are sufficiently similar and unusual that common
sense and reason can correlate them, but where there is no
overforeseeability. The first and second acts must be very similar. The
second is if empirical correlation between seemingly unrelated classes of
acts was demonstrable. For example, if expert testimony had been offered in
T W. that burglary created a predisposition toward sexual assault, and that
the assailant's hirer should have known about the correlation, then there
would be a prima facie case for finding a duty. A failure to make rounds
with residents regularly does not predict that a physician will lacerate a
vessel during surgery, but surgical complications with a far greater than
normal frequency might so predict. There is no rule that determines when
classes of acts are sufficiently similar to justify a conclusion that there is a
propensity. This may be the sort of issue best left to the courts.
Intervening superseding events:
Intervening superseding events present issues of both reliance and
foreseeability. The acquisition of information by the second employer
through means other than the reference in question affects reliance. The
passage of time affects both foreseeability and reliance.
Suppose Livingston had hired Gadams despite letters from Mendota and
Medoc that he had sexually assaulted students, but Golden Plains had sent a
glowing reference. This situation would have made Livingston aware of
Gadams' propensity for improper sexual conduct. At the same time,
Livingston would have had no need to rely on Golden Plains'
misrepresentation. This knowledge arguably should place the onus of duty
on Livingston and relieve Golden Plains of liability.
The passage of time modifies both reliance and foreseeability. Vick's
death from surgery occurred four years after Slowfinger joined the staff of
Prester John Hospital. Even if Slowfinger had poor clinical propensities that
117. T. W. v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
118. Seeid.at98.
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Mordor and Yancey failed to communicate to Prester John, they were likely
evident to his peers and to the hospital administration during the four years
that Slowfinger was clinically active at the hospital. There would have been
at least two biennial recredentialing investigations of Slowfinger's
performance during this interval. If the hospital became aware of
Slowfinger's problems through direct observation, then it no longer
reasonably relied on the reference from Mordor for knowledge regarding his
propensities and must take responsibility for Slowfinger's continued
privileges to practice. This knowledge should then constitute an intervening
superseding cause that relieves Mordor and Yancey of their duty to Vick.
Alternatively, if Slowfinger had spent those intervening years practicing
competently and without incident, there would not have been problems to
uncover during the credentialing process. An employer could most
reasonably conclude that either Yancey's concerns were mistaken or
Slowfinger's poor propensities had diminished. This would also be a
superseding event in the breach of the duty to Vick. In either case, it would
be unreasonable to find Mordor and Yancey liable for Vick's death once
Slowfinger's credentials have been renewed.
The retrieval of adverse infornation from the NPDB should also be an
intervening superseding event. If a hospital learns of a physician's prior bad
act from another source it can no longer rely on a hospital's failure to report
that act to avoid liability.
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F. Medical Employment And Employment Reference Case Law Finding Duty
To Third Parties"
t 9
There are two cases of note involving health care workers that have fact
patterns similar to those in Randi W. Both declined to follow the precedent
in Randi W., finding instead, in favor of the defendant. In the first case,
Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Center, Inc.,120 a federal district court,
following Minnesota law, granted summary judgment to a defendant faced
with a third-party allegation of negligent misrepresentation.' 21 Parson, a
male nurse, sexually assaulted the plaintiff, a female nurse working under
his supervision in a nursing home. 122 Parson had engaged in similar acts at
the hospital that previously employed him, resulting in his resigning under
119. Randi W. and related cases have spawned a voluminous body of literature on the
appropriateness of requiring former employers to disclose adverse information in
employment references. See generally Ashby, supra note 83; Deborah A. Ballam,
Employment References-Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil: A Proposal for Meaningful
Reform, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 445 (2002); J. Bradley Buckhalter, Comment, Speak No Evil:
Negligent Employment Referral and the Employer's Duty to Warn (Or, How Employers
Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too), 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265 (1998); Markita D.
Cooper, Beyond Name, Rank, and Serial Number: "No Comment" Job Reference
Polices, Violent Employees and The Need For Disclosure-Shield Legislation, 5 VA. J.
SoC. PoL'v & L. 287 (1988); Terry Ann Halbert & Lewis Maltby, Reference Check
Gridlock: A Proposal for Escape, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 395 (1998); Alex B.
Long, Note, Addressing the Cloud over Employee References: A Survey of Recently
Enacted State Legislation, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177 (1997); Susan Oliver, Note,
Opening the Channels of Communication Among Employers: Can Employers Discard
Their "No Comment" and Neutral Job Reference Policies?, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 687
(1999); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References:
Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
145 (1995); J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1998) (analyzing employment reference law from a law and
economics viewpoint). The interested reader is directed especially to the articles by
Saxton, Ashby, and Verkerke. This article does not recapitulate their discussion
regarding public policy considerations and protection from liability of parties supplying
recommendations. Rather, it focuses on the potential implications for health care
institutions and personnel who write recommendations on behalf of health care workers.
120. See Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 959 (D.
Minn. 1998).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 962.
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pressure.123 The resignation agreement stipulated disagreement regarding
his culpability. The resignation was characterized as voluntary. 124 The
agreement also included the text of the employment letter of reference to be
used, which stated "Mr. Parson has not been the subject of any disciplinary
action."' 125 This letter of reference was used when Parson applied for a new
job at a nursing home.126 In addition, a supervisor of Parson's at the hospital
told the nursing home that Parson had a good relationship with patients,127
but that he had some difficulty handling some employee issues. 12 Parson
was hired by the nursing home and subsequently enaged in unwanted
sexual touching of a co-employee at the nursing home. 12 While taking note
of the precedents in Gutzan, Golden Spread Council, and Randi W., the
court declined to allow a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.
The court held that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not previously ruled
that Minnesota law allowed such a claim, and declined to extend the law to
recognize this tort.' 31 Furthermore, the court held that the facts could not
support a finding of physical harm to the plaintiff as required for a cause of
action under § 31 1. 13 The court ruled, however, that a confidentiality
agreement between Parson and the hospital was not a defense. 133 The same
123. Id at 960.
124. Id. (quoting reference letter portion of the Resignation Agreement).
125. Id.
126. See Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
127. Id. at 961.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 962-64.
130. See id. at 987.
131. See id. at 987-88 (citing Smith v. Brutger Cos., 569 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn.
1997)).
132. Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
133. Id. at 991.
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court declined to reconsider the decision two years later on the basis of
subsequent Minnesota jurisprudence. 134
In the second case, Passmore v. Multi-Management Services, Inc., the
Indiana Supreme Court also declined to find a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation. 35 In Passmore, a nursing home employee was accused
of injuring a patient.' 36 The recommendation from a previous employer to
the nursing home did not mention that the patient had been accused of
assaulting patients there. 37 The court distinguished between intentional
misrepresentation based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310, which it
construed as overtly false representation of facts, and negligent
misrepresentation based on § 311, which it construed as failing to report
information. 38 On these facts, the court stated that it would have recognized
a cause of action based on § 310 had the evidence warranted such a finding.
It would not, however, recognize a cause of action based on § 311 because
of public policy considerations.' 39 The court was concerned that requiring
the reporting of unsubstantiated information would squeeze recommenders
into a cramped space between writing too much and writing too little and
would likely deter evaluators from providing meaningful information. 140
Therefore, in granting summary judgment, the court stated:
[W]e think it rather obvious that declaring employers liable for
negligence in providing employment references will lead universally
to employer reluctance to provide any information other than name,
rank, and serial number. Only those employers dull-witted enough to
issue free-wheeling assessments without calling their lawyers would
supply any but the most rudimentary information. A legal policy that
discourages providing assessments to subsequent employers will not
make for safer nursing homes, or other safe workplaces, for that
134. See Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 885, 886-91 (D.
Minn. 1999).
135. Passmorev. Multi-Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 810 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ind. 2004).
136. See id. at 1024-25.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 1026, 1028.
139. See id. at 1028.
140. See id. at 1026, 1028.
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matter. We therefore decline to adopt § 311 as it applies to
employment references.'
4 1
So far, no court has applied § 311 in the medical context. The plain
language of comments (d) and (e) to § 311 seems to invite liability based on
failure to report medical malpractice and other physician negligence. 142
Foreseeability of the second act is the primary element that § 3 11 establishes
as the requirement for liability. If the evaluator is aware that the physician
he recommends has performed acts that foreshadow negligence and the
subsequent physical harm to a victim, then failure to mention such acts
constitutes negligence on the part of the evaluator under § 311.143 Most
cases are likely to arise under § 3 11 (negligent misrepresentation) rather than
under § 310 (fraudulent misrepresentation) because courts have been
reluctant to characterize physician communications to patients as fraud.
Rather, they have tended to categorize even statements that physicians knew
or should have known were false as failure to render informed consent.'
44
One court declined to characterize a surgeon's erroneous statement to a
patient that he was Board certified as fraud because it would allow "the
possibility of punitive damages, and that would circumvent the requirements
for proof of both causation and damages."' 145 Another court, however, found
in a similar case a cause of action in negligent misrepresentation based on §
311.146
Finally, some courts have been freewheeling in finding third-party
liability to physicians in circumstances where there is no special relationship
141. Passmore, 810 N.E.2d at 1028.
142. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
143. In the absence of scienter; if scienter is present, this may constitute fraudulent
misrepresentation under Restatement (Second) Torts § 311.
144. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Wis. 1996); Howard v.
Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 800 A.2d 73, 75 (N.J. 2002). Both of these cases addressed
physician misrepresentation to patients about their experience or credentials, and
characterized these as failures to obtain informed consent.
145. Howard, 800 A.2d at 82.
146. See Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 914-15 (Colo. 2002) (involving a
physician who stated that he had performed an orthopedic procedure that he had, in fact,
never performed, and failed to disclose that amputation was a possible consequence of
the procedure).
Duty to Third Parties
in the traditional sense. 14 7 It is not far-fetched to postulate that these courts
will hold physicians liable for the contents of references.
III. DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN PROVIDING MEDICAL
EMPLOYMENT REFERENCES
A. Policy Considerations
The primary goal of tort law as applied to heath care workers and
institutions should be maximization of public health. The compensatory,
punitive, and expressive functions of the tort system are secondary. For
society to stress the latter, while impairing the ability of physicians and
hospitals to care for the health needs of the public, would be
counterproductive. An additional goal of tort law should be to create a
system that is predictable, transparent, and fair to those affected by it.
One possible effect of holding health care actors widely liable for their
employment references could be improvement in health care. Such a policy
would make deficient health care workers less employable and would
protect hospitals from other hospitals' ridding themselves of problem
doctors by allowing them to transfer to another institution. However, this
could lead to undesirable results as well. A system that requires extensive
reporting of real and suspected bad acts, and of negative opinions, might
discourage physicians from entering fields in which they have to tackle
difficult problems and are likely to make mistakes. Furthermore, within any
given field, they will be encouraged to turn away difficult cases. 148 The
147. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (I11. 1977)
(finding a duty was owed to child born eight years after medical error, and injured by that
error); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344-45 (Cal. 1976)
(finding psychiatrist owed a duty to diagnose intent to injure another, despite statement
from the American Psychiatric Association that the ability to do this regularly does not
fall within the professional expertise of psychiatrists); Osborne v. United States, 567
S.E.2d 677, 681 (W. Va. 2002) (finding a duty was owed to the person injured in motor
vehicle accident caused by patient taking improperly prescribed drug); Blaz v. Michael
Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 804 (N.D. Il. 1999) (finding the researcher
owed a duty to convey findings to subjects of study consisting of questionnaire and
retrospective chart review).
148. The New York State Department of Health publishes raw and corrected mortality
statistics for physicians performing cardiac bypass surgery. For links to all annual
reports, see DEP'T OF HEALTH, NEW YORK STATE, HEART DISEASE (2007), http://
www.nyhealth.gov/nysdoh/heart/heartdisease.htm. Anecdotally, some cardiovascular
surgeons turn down patients with co-morbid conditions that increase risk of mortality
because of these reporting requirements. Overall mortality in 1994 (the first year of
reporting) was 2.49 percent. In 2003 (the most recent year reported) mortality was 1.61
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mobility of physicians might be hampered, which might hamper the ability
of some communities to meet their medical manpower needs. And, the
additional stress arising from having one's negative accomplishments aired
whenever one makes a professional move might deter qualified people from
entering medicine altogether. Exposure to further liability may deter
physicians from accepting administrative positions, especially in hospitals
that do not compensate their clinical chairs. The public has an interest in
having these positions filled by willing physicians who are able to provide
competent oversight over the work of their colleagues.
Justice for potential patients is advanced when those responsible for
screening their caretakers have maximum information about them. On the
other hand, justice also requires that physicians be protected from damage
arising from the circulation of rumors, unsubstantiated accusations, and
unfounded negative opinions. Finally, evaluators merit protection against
physically and temporally remote consequences of their recommendations,
especially when institutions to which the statements were directed have had
ample opportunity to familiarize themselves with the subjects of the
recommendations.
Public policy should discourage hospitals from ignoring the bad acts of
those they supervise. Tort law should not provide disincentives for avoiding
the assumption of responsibility for the safety of others. Consequently, any
policy establishing a duty for recommenders should be coupled with
complementary policies requiring them to familiarize themselves with any
acts that they are obliged to report.
B. Proposed Law Regarding Negligent Misrepresentation in Medical
Employment References
The following discussion attempts to propose a set of rules that will
establish reasonable bounds for third-party liability for medical employment
references in those states that choose to recognize third-party causes of
action. 149
percent. It is not known to what extent the reporting program, as opposed to changing
indications and overall improvement in care contributed to these statistics. If high risk
patients are being turned down, it is not known if their outcome was better or worse with
medical treatment than it would have been had they undergone bypass surgery.
Furthermore, the applicability of this experience to other fields is not necessarily
warranted by this data.
149. Although this discussion directly addresses health care issues, particularly with
regard to credentialing, it should be clear that many of the points made are applicable to
employment situations in other areas.
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1. For What Information Should There be a Duty to
Report?
The starting yoint should be legislation in various states authorizing
service-letters. These letters permit employees to receive a written
statement at the conclusion of their employment, to appeal the letter's
contents, and to forward the contents of the letter as an employment
reference. There is a powerful public policy interest in requiring hospitals to
respond to requests for references in support of credentialing actions, and
this should be required in all jurisdictions. Regulatory mechanisms should
ensure that these references are accurate and transparent. Additionally, a
reference should be on file for all physicians beginning with the first
biennial recredentialing. This should be the initial instrument sent out in
response to requests. 151 A terminal reference letter should be prepared when
a physician leaves a hospital staff. State health departments or non-
governmental and accrediting bodies such as JCAHO should adopt
regulations to ensure that references are equivalent and parallel in content.
The content should detail the physician's scope of clinical practice and
evaluate the physician's competence with regard to the various attributes of
skill and character that contribute to competent performance. References
should also require that recommending institutions provide data quantifying
physicians' activities, such as the number and kinds of diagnoses and
admissions. Other peer recommendations should not be part of the
credentialing process. Even the most grossly unprofessional physicians can
always find someone to vouch for them. Regardless, these letters contribute
little, if any, value.
References should also include all formal findings against a subject
physician, subject to time limitations that will be discussed below. On the
other hand, unsubstantiated problems and accusations should not be
reported, and failure to report them should not be actionable.
Complementary policies are required to ensure that hospitals do not maintain
a posture of willful ignorance. Hospitals should be required to investigate
the role of any physician in all allegations of inappropriate conduct, and in
all clinical incidents that the institution is legally required to report to the
state or to JCAHO. It should be noted that reporting requirements differ
150. See Saxton, supra note 119, at 57.
15!. If a request for a reference is sought prior to the first recredentialing, the hospital
should prepare it in accordance with the guidelines provided in this section, and keep it
on file. The reference should be updated at the time of each recredentialing, or if the
hospital in the interim becomes aware of knowledge that should be included in such a
letter.
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among the various states, and that JCAHO requires reporting of sentinel
events. A sentinel event is defined as:
[A]n unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or
psychological injury, or the risk thereof. Serious injury specifically
includes loss of limb or function. The phrase "or the risk thereof'
includes any process variation for which a recurrence would carry a
significant chance of a serious adverse outcome. 
152
Hospitals should be required to make a formal finding with regard to any
involved physician in any of these circumstances. Records of these
investigations and outcomes should be maintained in a data file subject to
state inspection and audit. Hospitals would be required to conclude one of
four things regarding the physician's role: (1) that the physician's actions
met professional standards; (2) that the physician deviated from those
standards; (3) that the physician grossly deviated from those standards (e.g.,
he was unprofessional or reckless); or (4) that it is indeterminate whether the
physician met professional standards. This finding would be part of the
physician's file and would be communicated as part of any reference that the
hospital issued within ten years of the alleged incident. Moreover, this
finding would be privileged in malpractice actions, but not in state
disciplinary or criminal actions.
Findings would be made by a hospital body whose membership included
professional, administrative and public members, with the professionals in a
majority. The physician under investigation would have an opportunity to
present evidence, and would have both a right to review and a right to appeal
adverse findings. The requirement for investigation and reporting should be
limited to complaints with a nexus to the hospital, including office-related
complaints by patients the physician treated at the hospital. It should also
include complaints by or regarding non-patients (such as employees,
contractors, and salespeople) who have a nexus to the hospital. Hospitals
ordinarily should not be permitted to investigate or report on a physician's
activities unrelated to his association with the hospital.
A statement of opinion from the physician's supervisor (usually his
department chair) regarding a physician's abilities relative to professional
standards and relative to peers should be part of the reference. However,
this statement must cite supporting data for any negative judgments.
152. THE JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., SENTINEL EVENT
POLICY AND PROCEDURES 1 (2007), http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres
/F84F9DC6-A5 DA-490F-A91 F-A9FCE26347C4/0/SE-chapterjulyO7.pdf.
153. However, events without a nexus that the hospital can appropriately use as a
basis for sanctions against the physician's privileges, such as criminal conviction, would
be within a hospital's investigative purview.
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Separation agreements that restrict the contents or language of employment
references, or that affirmatively stipulate their contents or language, should
be void and unenforceable.
Three mechanisms will protect physicians against inappropriately
negative recommendations. The first is limitation of the subject matter of
recommendations, as detailed above. The second is the opportunity for
physicians to review and appeal factual material included in the reference.
Finally, material in the reference whose subject is outside the scope of the
specified parameters should not be privileged. Compliance with these
reporting requirements would protect evaluators from third-party liability for
misrepresentation under a Randi W. theory based on § 311. Failure to
comply, on the other hand, would make evaluators liable for negligent
misrepresentation, subject to the following additional constraints.
2. For What Subsequent Acts by a Subject Should an Evaluator
be Liable?
Failure to report required information would be a breach of duty, resulting
in liability for a foreseeable injury. This rule requires elaboration because
foreseeability is, to a large extent, conclusory rather than predictive. A fair
foreseeability rule must deal with the problem of overforeseeability-the
problem that ubiquitous acts appear to predict other ubiquitous acts if there
seems to be a rational nexus. As discussed above, acts of medical negligence
are overforeseeable. Since these proposed reporting requirements are
heavily biased in favor of reporting documented incidents of physician
negligence, a fair rule will ordinarily not allow a cause of action against the
evaluator for subsequent acts of simple negligence by the subject of the
reference. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that allowing a claim
of negligence to climb so far up a ladder of causality will improve medical
care. However, two situations would require third-party liability by the
evaluator. One is failure to report physical or mental limitations that
interfere with the physician's practice. The other is a physician's marked
deviation from usual practice pattems, as described in Section II above.
This article, therefore, proposes the following rule, which should satisfy the
requirements of fairness:
With regard to references for a physician or other health care worker:
1. Reckless and intentional acts: It shall be a presumption rebuttable
by a preponderance of evidence that a reckless or intentional act by a
physician or other health care worker, acting under the color of a
relationship with a referring institution, that results in injury to or that
endangers the physical safety of a patient, an employee or agent of the
institution, or other person on the premises of the institution,
constitutes a propensity to repeat the act.
2. Negligent acts: It is a presumption rebuttable by clear and
convincing evidence that a negligent act by a physician or other health
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care worker, acting under the color of a relationship with a referring
institution, that results in injury to or that endangers the physical
safety of a patient, an employee or agent of the institution, or other
person on the premises of the institution, does not constitute a
propensity to repeat the act. Evidence of a physician's physical or
mental impairment, or of a pattern of unusual acts by a physician
deviating markedly in nature or frequency from acts that are within
the scope of behavior of a normal practitioner of the same sort (which
scope of behavior includes departures from accepted standards of
practice occasionally, but not frequently seen in a normal
practitioner), will, however, rebut this presumption.
3. Evidence that may be used to affirm or rebut the presumption in (1)
or (2) may include, but is not limited to,
A. Any act that the physician or other health care worker
committed before an institution supplied the reference, which the
institution knew or should have known about prior to supplying
the reference, or
B. Any opinion that the institution or its agents expressed about
the physician or other health care worker prior to supplying the
reference.
Certain intervening events should supersede reliance and, therefore,
eliminate liability. First, if an institution that granted privileges or medical
staff admission becomes aware of the offending physician's propensities
prior to occurrence of the bad act under litigation and unreasonably failed to
act, then the recommending institution should not be liable for failure to
report that bad act. Second, any liability would be terminated by the second
hospital's recredentialing the physician, provided such recredentialing
occurs at least twelve months following the initial appointment. 154 Third,
hospitals have no duty to report acts that occurred more than ten years before
the date of the reference. Finally, any breach of duty resulting in a cause of
action arising from negligent misrepresentation must arise from the same
sort of act that an evaluator failed to communicate in the reference.
3. Miscellaneous Considerations
Individuals preparing references on behalf of hospitals should be
considered agents of those hospitals, and should be protected by vicarious
liability, unless they knowingly write a false recommendation without the
hospital's knowledge or permission. Cases involving references should be
adjudicated using the substantive law of the state where the reference
154. By granting a physician credentials for a second time, a hospital is
acknowledging that it is able to evaluate that physician independent of references from
other institutions that were required for initial admission to the staff.
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originated. It is unfair to hold evaluators responsible for knowledge of rules
in a myriad of jurisdictions, and applying the strictest rule would, in effect,
give the state that promulgated that rule unfair extraterritorial reach.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 has given rise to a series of
cases that find liability to injured third parties for misleading employment
references. Because of the importance of references in physician
employment and the complexity of the issues surrounding these references,
this development has potentially far-reaching implications for the health care
industry. Rigorous application of § 311 to information transmitted about
physicians from one hospital to another has the potential to cause significant
damage to the processes of physician education and employment. The
suggestions in this article will allow institutions to exchange information
without fear, and at the same time will protect the public against hospitals'
using falsely positive recommendations to dump problem physicians on
other institutions.
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